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This project began as a literature search for generalizations 
about the nature of communications and information within the R&D 
decision processes which might be relevant to the development of federal 
policies regarding research and development. We were looking for 
ideas and formulations, either formal or informal, which appeared 
to be true (or at least accepted by a "reasonable'' set of professionals) 
and which could serve as a methodology or as a poss'ible 
support for some general, relevant propositions. Several 
different academic and professional areas were surveyed. These 
included economics, management, operations research, decision theory, 
information science, engineering, political science, and accounting. 
The major journals and books in each of these fields were surveyed in 
some detail. 
It became clear very early that the proper focus of the project 
was not upon "communication'' and information in general. The more 
relevant aspects of the general problem dealt with decisions and how 
com=unication and informatio:1 bear upon decision making processes_ 
If communication and information have any effects relevant for policy 
purposes, stirely such effects are upon the actual decisions made. The 
perfo~·mance of the R&D sector,. which is the primary object of policy 
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analysis, will reflect the decisions of those involved in R&D, and these 
decisions in turn will be determined by the patterns of information and 
con1.munication and the nature of the decision prou·sses themselves. 
We could make no interesting statements at all about communication 
or information without considering in detail the mt"ans by which the 
information might be transformed into a decision, Consequer:.tly the 
focus of the project became decision processes and the relate-d d{'cision 
theory. 
No one will be surpris,•d to learn that Wf:; found no panacea to 
the problem of designing federal R&D policies. P1·o!Jlems abound, but 
we are willing to draw four types of conclusions: (l) conclusions about 
the literature; (2) conclusions about the R&D phenomena which can be 
inferred from this literature; (3) conclusion::; about p:~tential policies; 
and (4) conclusions about potential research developments in these areas. 
In addition, from time t.o tirne we offer our judgments and opinions 
about a variety of propositions which on the basis of current knowl0dge 
cannot be absolutely confinned or rejected. 
The paper is_ divide:d into four major sections. The first part 
is a survey of the dE-cision theoretic literaturv. F\·ur diffen·J.I typE'S of 
decision processes or models ar<, described in generrtl terms. Probl('Jns 
invoh·cd with the applications of the models ar<' ontli1>ed. Th•_ S{'Cond 
section examines the extent to which rcsull::; found in the liter2.ture can 
be applied direcr:!.Y_ to the design of a federal R&D policy. Thi· third 
St"ction draws sonJ~ inferences fyurn this lit(ratur<" about the n2tur(' of 
the R&D proc0ss which St"E'm to b0 reh·vanl fur policy. The fin;:d S('ction 
Sl'Dl.tnarizes lh(• conclusions. 
I. THE DECISION THEORETIC LITERATURE 
The potentially relevant literature is irnn.<·r.sc· in siz,. and 
breadth. It appears prin1arily under thL" headings uf manageml'nt, 
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engineering and engineering management. Relevant discussions can 
be found in many disciplines, including accounting, econo1nics, statistics, 
psychology, political science, sociology and business. It varies in 
complexity from anecdotal business stories to applications of the more 
recent developments in stochactic optimization theory. 
Of the several ways of pOssibly partitioning this literature, 
we have chosen to focus upon the structure of the decision·making 
process. We could have partitioned the literature along the lines of 
academic disciplines; or according to the place in the overall R&D process 
the decisions are usually made; or according to the formal tools used 
to describe the decision process. These classification schemes are 
not really independent since there has been some tendency for the 
disciplines to specialize in both the type of tools applied to the problem 
of understanding R&D decision processes and in the type of processes 
examined. Thus our first category, optimization models, has been 
examined most extensively in the engjneering management literature. 
The second type of process, scoring models, has been examined 
most extensively fronYa structural point of view in the political economy 
literature, even though the applications appear in the management 
litC"rature. The third class, cost-benefit and production function models, 
has been developed almost cx.clusively by economists. Screening and 
committee processes, the last category, have received attention in a 
tangential way from management science, sociology and political economy. 
A. Optimization Models 
Optimization models are designed to answer the question: How 
does one decide upon the "optimum'' strategy when confronted with 
competing research proposals? The form of the question carries two 
implications which are reflected in the literature. First, the theory 
is developed from the point of view of an individual decision m.aker. 
Secondly, thC" dctaih·d models usually perlain to the problem of project 
selection. 
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Researchers primarily i)Jiend for the models to help an 
individual decision maker. The F.:.rpose of the research appears to be 
to provide models which c2.n :;crVC' as dec.ision aids rather than models 
which detail the behavior of some ongoing process. How can the 
individual organize his affai:rs so as to attain some well-specified result? 
In this .respect the literature can be viewed as an adaptation of the 
statistical decision theory' found in [DeGroot, 1970], [Fishburn, 1970] 
or [White, 1967], to the special case of R&D decisions. The particular 
decision maker who might u1;e these models is freque.ntly supposed to 
be a manager working in the cnvironmC'nt of a profit, or at least goal, 
oriented organization. 
Many models are available. Cetron, Martino and Roc·pcke 
[1967] describe over thirty different models and cite over 150 papers 
on models in the bibliography. Detailed summaries of selected models 
can be found in [Cetron, et a.l., 1969}. [Baker and Pound, 1964], 
[Gear, Lockett and Pears.on, 1971], [Souder, 1972], [Bealtie.and 
Reader, 1971], [Lucas, 1971]. 
Optimization models arc nf tlw following .general fonT'.. First 
a set of outcorncs, 0, are identified and to each outcome x t: 0 a number 
W(x) is altached. The function W(x) is called the 11 objeclivl:! function," 
"values, 11 or "weights," and it iS the C"~ctual mathematical {'Xprcssion 
that is maximized by a programming technique. The outcomes frequently 
have the interpretation of 11goals ' 1 or "objectives. ' 1 Some authors 
d12mand that this s'et have a type of internal struclur<:! such ;u: indepcndeucy. 
The weights, then, are interpreted in some value sense. They arc 
alv1ays numbers, and carry all of the quantilalh·c- implicati<...<l.S of 
numbers (very little care is exhibi',cd on this point-- contrary lo what 
one finds in economics [Chipman, l971J, [DeGroot, 1970), [Fishburn, 
1970] ), 
Projects arc described in terrns of a set of charac.:t~·rio..tics or 
f('atures, C, Exactly what goes ir.·o this ch'tss varies fran< one' procedure· 
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to another, but it can contain characteristics such as initial cost outlay, 
qualifications of the investigator (in terms of papers, citations, peer 
ratings, inventions, patents), probable return to capital, and time lapse 
prior to results. Once C has been established, it is connected to 0 by 
means of some transformation T: C-- 0. Sumznarizing, we have for 
each project j€ J, when J is the set of proposed projects, a set of descriptions 
C{j} which translate into outcomes T(C{j) ) which are then valued 
W(T{C(j)) ). The problem is to maximize W(x) for je J subject to 
x= T(C(j) ). This type of model is certainly familiar to economists. 
We will outline b..vo simple examples, 
Example l. (the case of selecting only a single project) 
Objective index set: G = f l, 2, ... , . } 
Example 2. 
Objective importance: 0 f. vi' lEa and~ v; 
Project index set~ J = {1,2, ... ~ iEG 
100. 
Project j 1s contribution to objective i: .16 y,. ~1. lJ 
Project jis probability of success: Pr[j]. 
max 
iEJ (i~G viyij) Pr (j) cost~j) 
Consider a research on a product capable 
of providing several different services. Let 
the lypes of services it can perform be indexed 
by i ::: 1, 2, • , N. 
vi. :'($cost per uO.it of t;ervh:e i when using a 
competitiVe product) minus {$ cost per unlt 
aervice i when using our potential product). 
x. :::: units of service used. 
l 
Value of j ::I. x.v. 
l 1 l 
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Aside from. complexity, what seems to be the problern? There 
are clearly practical and an<dytical problems. These are well recognized 
[Lockett ancl Gear, 1972], [Kazanowc:ki, 1968], [Roberts, 1967]. Aside 
from these, there are two addition;:,]_ problems which detract from. the 
potential usefulness of thest· models at a national policy level. The first 
problem, the problem of determining the objective function, arises wilh 
the transfer of these techniques to lhc social level. The second problem 
arises from the use of probability numbers. 
All of the models use some quantitative n1eans of determining 
success. In the case of a firm this can make a lol of sense. The 
business organization, as ':nch, has a rather clearly defined purpose. 
Few would argue that when all lhC' othC'r t(·sts fail, one can theoretic<dly 
resolve competition betwcvn proj('cts in tc·rms of their ultimate contribu-
tion to profits. In thC' cas(C of a social S{-Lting, one ~ust first determine 
the allocative implications of the various R&D projects. The analog of 
profits in this social setting WD\lld bt.: the social preference or social 
welfare if such quantities could be systematically defined. The problem 
here is that all attempts to do.fine such things have resulted in 
impossibilily rc•sults fArrow, 1963], [Fishbl:rn, 1973]. (Plott, 1972]. 
These results point to a funcbmrntal theorc!ical problem (in addition to 
any practical problem) whidl stems from thE> application at thE: grc,··p 
lC\'el of a theory developed for an individual decision maker. The most 
current research l,.t.lds not cven a gl.i.um1cr of hope for a solution. 
The second prnblen--:. is also of a fundamental nature. The 
nwdels require some probability as~ ... ~-;snwnt to b<> attached tv s;:c:.:· s~ 
indicators, Typically, th(;sc· prnb:.tbilitivs are ubtll.im:d ft :nn a s(·ric·s 
of experts. The question that needs to be raised pertains to the ad(·r:;.uacy 
of a number such as probab:ility to accurately carry inforn>c,tio!: abc.ut an 
expert 1S atlitudt' about thf' n~cct-·ss prospects of a project. Ev{_n 1nore 
serious questions exist abot'<l what is involved when one compares such 
numbers betweC'n experts. 
For concreteness, let's consider the following procedure. 
There is a set, G, of goals, e. g., the gadget works in all products; 
the gadget can be produced with existing equipment; etc, There 
is a set, E, of experts and a set, J, of proposed projects. From 
each expert, i E E, we get a matrix [ Pijk J j E J, k E G, 
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indicating the probability, in his opinion, that project j = 1, 2, . , . will 
attain the given goal k. These data are transformed, then, into an 
''evaluation" Pjk which indicates for each project, j, the "real 
probability" that it will achieve goal k. 
Notice now that we are discussing projects which have never 
been attempted before. Each project is unique, so there can be no 
verified relative frequency of success to which the expert can refer in 
providing his probability estimate, Consequently, we may be willing 
to accept as meaningful only the qualitative aspects of his opinion. We 
might accept his statement that 11 j is more likely to be successful lhan 
r II aS meaningful, While at the Same time be UnWilling tO accept the 
full im.plications of his statement that "j is 20o/o more likely to succeed 
than j'. 11 The latter statement requires a much more complicated 
and involved type of probability and belief system. 
If we are dubious about the quantitative aRpects of subjective 
probability, what can we say? Again, for the case of three or more 
experts, we have fou11d ourselves in the middle of irnpossibility results. 
To be precise, we state th<' following reforn111lation of a well-known 
impossibility theorem. 
Let (Ll, ... , L 11 ) be the rankings by n ~ 3 experts, according 
to Lheir opinion about the relative likelihood of success of K ~ 3 projects. 
Now by using 11rankings" we avoid the use of quantitative probabililies 
as alternpted in [All\'n, 1968], see also [Jones, 1969]. We seek an 
aggregate ranking A {Lt •... , Ln) such that: 
·{1) A(Ll, ... , L
11
) is d<>fined for all (Ll, ... , L 11 ); 
(2) if j is judged more likely than j 1 by all judges, then 
judged more likely than j' under A(.L1, .•. , L 11 ); 
is 
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(3) the relative likeliho-od of success of j and j1 under A( L 1, ... , Ln) 
depends only upon the judges 1 opinions about j and j 1 and~ 
on some other project j 11 ; 
(4) there is no overriding 11best judge 11 in that if he thinks j is 
more likely than j', then j is deemed ''more likely" than j' 
regardless of the opinions of the other judges. 
It can be proven that no aggregation procedure has all of these properties. 
This means, essentially, that. when aggregating across experts, 
one must be using (perhaps implicitly) the more quantitative properties 
of expressed opinion. On the other hand, it is safe to say that we do·not, 
at any level, understand the possible quantitative structure (or lack of 
such) of personal probabilities. 
These questions would be academic if the quantitative subjective 
probabilities were successfully used often enough to justify any general 
claims of success in the selection of projects, but this is nvL the case 
[Gee, 1971]. They would also be academic if an experimental methodology 
or theoretical structure were on the horizon which would allow good and 
poor 1nodels to b<" unar:nbiguously diffcrenlia!f·d, but th'is is not tho:: casC' 
either. The few tests of the accur.?lcy of subjective probabilities have 
produced ambiguous rc:sulls [EJonder, 1969; Mleadows, b/3], and the 
tests o! selection models th::..t use probability estimates i:1 !he "field" 
have been so few lh;d- g ... ·ncJ·alizations cannot he rnadc [SondPr, 1973]. 
Fron1 the experinicntal point of view, Delphi. techniques are receiving a 
lot of attention [Fusfcold and Foster, 1971], [Pill, 197!]. The Delphi 
technique involves a methodolog}' for achieving some consensus over the 
relative probabilities without interferc·nce of personality factors. If 
consensus can always be assured, thE' impossibility result could bt.· 
eliminated by eliminating condition 1 abov·e. At this stage, however, 
one could not honcstl}' propose the use of Delphi as part of a national 
R&D policy. 
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On the theoretical front, we have measurement theory [Krantz, 
et al., l97IJ. As a theoretical approach to problems it has the 
capacity to untangle the idea of personal probabilities in a manner 
useful for R&D project selection purposes. This area is apparently 
not receiving much attention outside of psychology right now. 
Consequently, the theoretical works are designed to meet the needs 
of that discipline rather than R&D. 
B. Scoring Models 
In a mathematical sense scoring models subsume most of the 
other models we have discussed. From an abstract point of view, 
almost everything, many optimization models included, become scoring 
models. We have no need for such an abstract development here so we 
will stick to the descriptions as they are found in lhe literature, Scoring 
models as applied to R&D decisionmaking are W(dl presented by Moore 
and Baker [1969a and 1969bJ. 
1n essence- a scoring modd as appli<"d to project selection is 
much like a balloting systf"m. In this rcspt•ct it is not surprising that 
much of what is known about the structure of such m.odels cornes from 
political science and the closely related field of social choice theory 
[Sen, 1970]. [Fishburn. 1973 J. The idea is that projects should receive 
scores or points (or votes) in accord with how they stack up on several 
different criteria. 
From a theoretical point o£ view il is known that~ scoring 
systems can exhibit very peculiar behavior, From a behavioral point 
of view, with one exception, [Pessen1ier and Baker, 1971), 1 almost 
nothing is known, Rather than Stlrvt·y the potential types of scoring 
systems and their related problems, we will examine only two types 
and demonstrate some of their unusual features. 
10 
Many scoring models involve rank order voting at some stage. 
Projects in a fixed set are ranked according to predetermined criteria. 
Consider the criteria: 
A. Success predictions 
B. Test facilities and capabilities 
C. Contribution to othe;r ongoing projects 
D. Quality of personnel 
E. Stability of personnel level 
F. Reliability of deadline estimates 
G. Consistency with general funding objectives 
Each of four projects, w, x, y, z, arc then ranked according to these 
seven criteria listed on the table, Each project is assigned a score, 
for each category, equal to its rank in that category. 
Criteria Aggregate Scor:_c 
A BC DEF G Case 1 Cas e2~ rank 1 X W X y w y w w l 3 
£ w z w X Z X Z X 
--'-"-
l 
3 z y z w y wy y 19 l 
4 y X y Z X Z X z 20 -T 
l . 
This paper advocates th(· u,;e of dollar metric data fo:- !he: 
evalualion of projects. In essence, tln• preferences of j;__:dgcs art 
measured in terms of what they w0ul<.l pay for various projects. lL 
has been shown elsewhere (Lichtenstein, 1971} that this particular 
m<:!asnre of preference can sy>->tenntically contradict other mf:asurt-s 
of prderence. Th(' full implications of these facts for the dollar 
mt:tric approachvs are yet to be c;..;plored. 
' :r-
J-
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The lop ranked gets a score of 1, and the lowest ranked gets a score of 
4. An aggregate score is comput~d for each project by adding together 
the scores it received on the individual criteria. The project with the 
Judge 
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Projects by Ass~.&!!_ed Class by Judge 
Excellent Abov~ Average Avc~·ao-c Below Average Poor 
y z X 
~score wins. 2 X y z 
The aggregate scores are shown on the righl of the figure as 
Case I. Clearly project w wins with 13 points, and it is accepted, 
Now if we had sufficient money remaining for another project, we would 
be tempted to spend it on project x; it is second in line, Obviously we 
would hesitate to spend it on z, which had the worst score. Yet, if we 
recompute the scores with w eliminated, we find that z obtains the 
best score. The totals are shown as Case 2. 
Let's take another example. Suppose seven judges named 
1, 2, , .• , 7 respectively, are asked to evaluate three projects x, y and z. 
Each judge is to grade each project according to a five-point scale. If 
the pr-oject is excellent iL gets 5 points. If it is high average, it gets 
4 points; average gets 3 points; low av-erage gets 2 points, and poor 
projects get l point. The points given to a project by the seven judges 
are then summed. The project with the highest sum is chosen. 
The ratings by the judges are shown on the table below. It 
reflects the apparent behavioral fact that judges tend to assign their 
median ranked alternative to the "average" category. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
y 
z 
X 
z 
X 
z X 
X y 
y z 
X y 
y z 
The: aggregate scores arc 22 for x; Zl for y; 20 for z. Clearly 
x is the "best" and z is the "worst" according to this model. x will be 
chosen and implemented. 
Suppose, prior lo the final tabulation, a new proposal w is 
received and passed along lo lhe judges for their evaluation with the 
rest. It is not a very good proposal in that .each judge rates project z 
higher. Suppose in fact that ca.ch judge ranks th~· ncv: project just below 
z but just above whatever alternative was previously just below z. For 
judges 2, 5 and 7, z was previously low, so the nt:w project is now Jow<::.st. 
Of coursf', with w present, some of thr· j\Jdt;t--S n-lUst rescale 
some of the alternatives. We supposl' they tend to avoid the lowest 
catt:gories (this has bf'en reported as a behavic,r;;.l fact [N-:-•rdh;:..us<::r, 1171]. 
Tht~ rescaling is shcJ'.'.'H in the· tablt· below. 
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Judge E~_e:ellent Above Average Average Below Average Poor 
y z w X 
2 X y z w 
3 y z w X 
4 z w X y 
5 X y z w 
6 z w X y 
7 X y z w 
The total scores are 20 for w; 25 for x; 26 for y; and 27 for z. 
The clear winner is z which was the previous loser, and the loser (aside 
from w which is really low) is x which was the previous winner. The 
introduction of w reversed the ranking between x, y and z, even though 
each judge 1s rank of x, y and z remained constant. 
Now do these examples mean that scoring models should not 
be used? No. They mean that scoring models are delicate things the 
full implications of which are not likely. to be understood by the user. 
Until much more is known about such mo<kls we would not suggest 
using them as a basis for legislation or widespread administrative 
actions. 
The examples simply serve as signals. The structure of the 
scoring procedure car. influence decisions in way;; the us"'r n1ay not 
anticipate. Frorrl a mathelnatical point of view onE:: can show that 
"pcculiar 11 behavior is nol at all unlikely. From. an a"ctual behavioral 
point of view lhe likelihood of behavior such as demonstrated by the 
examples above has never been inv("stigated. 
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C. Production Function Studies 
What is the R&D ~1m doing for us? To the extent that 
R&D is a program. separately funded and composed of many separate 
projects, this .~s certainly a legitimate question. Funds used for R&D 
could be used for something else including other R&D programs. 
Should the ~&D division receive more money this next year? Should 
Feder!i-1 re·search dollars go to physics or should they go to economics? 
Clearly these are important problems and they are the type of problems 
that production function models and cost benefit models are intended to 
help solve. 
There are two separate problems involved. First there is a 
means/end problem. What are the relationships between the controls 
we have available and the pattern of results we see? If we want a 
particular result do we know how to achieve it with the means available? 
The second problem involves evaluation of the ends. Would we know 
what· we want even if we knew how to get it? So the first problem relates 
to 11 how'' we might go about achieving certain ends, while the second 
problem is one of assigning vahws to ends. 
Pr.ogram evaluation is difficult. Some people suggest simple 
rules (e. g., "does the competition surprise ns"), but these se<>n1 
inadequate and the problem remains hard for several reasons. Firsl, 
because R&D takes a long time, it is very difficult to decide upon a 
tirr1e reference. We can conceptually determine today how good the 
program was five years ago; but how do we determine today the quality 
of the program today, when the results will noi become known f(Jr fi·:r· 
more years? In addilion, the data are usually bad. There are even 
theoretical problems which stem from the nature of joint costs. For 
exarnplc, a good R&D program can aid in recruiting by increasing 
corporate prestige, serve as a training ground for c·mployces, and 
serve as a general source of "sci<'ntific intelligt:nc0" for the uq;ar,iz<:ttion. 
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This latter feature, in turn, can be a catalyst to a cross-fertilization 
of knowledge among divisions used in operating procedures and in 
evaluating the competition. A good R&D group can even help sales by 
providing a fundamental understanding of the firm's products as well 
as competilor's products. All of these benefits are potentially there 
but are almost impossible to measure. It is apparently necessary to 
lump all R&D expenditureS together even though they are likely to have 
contributed to almost every aspect of the organization. 
Almost all approaches in this class involve some type of 
econometric model. The model C!.Pt::: a~Rt-k+B is a popular form, 
although the variables may differ between applications, 
pt (sales, profits, productivity, rn.arket share, cost 
savings, earnings, etc.) at time period t. 
Rt-k = R&_D expenditures at time t-k where k is a constant 
indicating the ~ag between expenditures and results. 
a, B =constants to be estimated by the procedure. 
Managers also keep an eye on certain statistics such as revenue from 
new products/revenue from all products; costs/profits; percentage of 
products that experienc.ed a quality improvement; and number of patents. 
Occasionally these statistics are reviewed with an ey<:> toward the claims 
mad(' in preproject proposals. 
Models like this are found most frequently in the nianagC'mcnt 
and engineering managen1cni literature [Horowitz, 1963], [Taymour, 
1972]. They are suggested there for usc in the evaluation of R&D 
programs. The theory b(ohind thl' t;quation is clearly that R&D effort 
in some sense influences or dcte1·1nines sales, 
Curiously enough, the inverSl" of this function is ust:d in the 
industrial organization literalur~ of economics and it is accompani<'d 
by the exact opposite th<::ory. Rath..:r than R&D expenditures producing 
sales, it is presupposed that sal('s (or size) produces R&D. The th('ory 
that larger firms undertake more R&D is relevant to policies that 
might affect the size of firm;;. 
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Which theory is right? ·which way does causality go? Grether 
(1974] claims that all attempts to rvsolve this dilemma are unsuccessful. 
This claim, if correct, ch,arly casts doubt upon the use of the manage-
ment models as a backbone for R&D program evaluation at this time. 
The simple regression model does not exhaust the literature. 
Brockhoff [1970] uses a linea.r programming approach to estimate 
parameters indexing the productivity of research input. The reader 
should also reference Minasian [1969} and Mansiield 1s [1972) general 
survey. 
This problem of determining the relationship between input 
and output is characteristic of both cost-benefit studies and cost-
effectiveness studies. In addition, thcs(' studies attcn1pt to evaluate 
the program by evaluating itt:l contribution to somt?' (already evaluat~d) 
outco1ne. 
The major (implicit) critics of these procedures are those 
who feel that evaluation shonld be devoted primarily to inputs. The 
reference [Edwards and McCarn:::y, 1'173} contains a gaud surve:-y of 
studies involving the measurement of an individual researcher's 
performance. Overall pcrfonnane<' as nwctSured by pt:•er ranl:i ·.;::=: 
quantity and quality of \Vrittcu output as measured by citation counts 
and peer ratings, and variou~: measures of thC' c"~'eativity of output are:: 
discussed as possible: indicators of performance. Howr::vo;:r, th<· v<o.ri0us 
studies revieWL'I;i lf:nd to disagrl'c on which variables corrdat,c, ;;.nd all 
01 the studies SL'Cm to aduj,: a rnc.:tsurv of pl·rfvrn1anc<.: whic!-: l--:as <::.n 
obscure relationship to th(· type of pcrforn1ancC' the employing 
org·anization requires. Part of the problem hero: is the lack uf <: 
defini!.ion for the lattL·r type- of p<·rforn1ancv. Th('S(' auth0rs cLI~JJd•~ 
that performanco ca:u~ot lw rn<:asurcd by onv critvrion --if indt:c:d it 
can be measure-d at all. 
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Another source of implied criticism is found in the accounting 
literature. There are differences of opinion within that discipline. 
For example, [Newman, 1968J argues that accounting data are much 
too poor to use in an evaluation. Other scholars are more ''hard line" 
on accounting. Budgets should be prepared and manage1nent should 
judge performance relative to the prespecified goals. The following 
quote is taken from [Sasaki, 1969]: 
A carefully prepared budget is essential in planning the over-all 
R&D program .. It is the only device which summarized detailed 
man-hour schedules, equipment schedules, purchasing plans, 
personnel acquisition forecasts, etc., in a way that both technical 
and nontechnical executives can easily understand in terms of 
dollars and cents. Without this formal device to focus attention 
on research plans, the R&D program would tend to drift into 
those areas of greatest interest to individual scientists, or- into 
pet projects of certain managers. In using concrete program 
planning it is possible to lower the cost of research by eliminating 
duplicate research effort, by weeding out undesirable projects, by 
focusing scientists' attention on research costs and the need-for 
research productivity, and by anticipating otherwise unforeseen 
difficulties. To gain these advantages, lhe development of an 
R&D budget can be divided into four stages: 
1. Setting _a target figure 
2. Initial project budgeting 
3. Project co-ordination by research executives 
4. Review by top managetncnt 
The third source of criticism arises over the assignment of 
values when the discussions move to the social realm. We have covered 
this problem above. The thcorf'tical proble1n of social \'<lluation applies 
here as well. 
D. Screening and Committee Processes 
A decision process which involves a sequence of hurdles or 
hierarchy of decision makers will be called a screening process. In 
these processes the proj{•cts undertaken are n0t the ones "selected" 
they are the ones which survive. We know of no general survey or 
study of screening processes even though they appear to '!Je frequently 
used in industry. We are also unable to find a means of jCJdging what 
a systematic study might reveal without getting into the whole area of 
the behavioral aspects of laboratory n1anagernent (sec su:·\•ey by J. P. 
Martino [1973) ). Consequen.tly we must drop this in·.portant topic and 
move to narrower considerations. 
Frequently the decision procedures involve judgment by 
committee, The very fact that a committee is involn:-d may exert lts 
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own influence. We turn then to some observations o:' co1nmittee processes. 
There is reason to suspect that groups mak<.: riskier decisions 
than do individuals [Wallach, 1962]. We arc not aware of a field test 
of this proposition, but it would appear that R&D would be- an appropriate 
setting. If laboratory results carry over to thC' n1ore corr.plicated arena, 
we would have reason to suspect that organization of decisions along 
committee lines n1ight influence, toward greater risk, the nature of 
accepted projects. We know that committees whose membei-s ha \'C 
divergent interests lend to Jnake less accurate decisions than groups 
whose members have harmonious interests [Bowers, 1965]. Org;;miza-
tions which put divergent inkrC'sts on commiltl·c.s in ord· r ~o foskr 
11organizational harmony" ma.y well do so at the expcn~C: 'Jf efficiency~ 
Many are unaware of the potential pitfalls uf or~<.nizvtion ctlong 
comrnittec, as opposed to individual, decision linE·s. Th.-· genercd 
feeling of managers appears to be that conJmitlt·e proc<:=d·1rcs i1:volve 
no 1norc than a cun1bin2tion of a balloting prvcl·t.lurv w~(l; j)Vric,c]s '·'· hl·l"•: 
those members of the organization who hold cxt·rcme pc,s~~ions arE: (o 
persuade or be persuad~·d by the other n1en1lwrs, H ·'-''("\"C r, lab,,;atory 
results indicate that member~> with the corre-ct view will adopt arl 
incorrect view when subjected to group pressures (Asch, 1951}. 
Methods which force consensus may well achieve littlC: tc~rc th~n a 
"median" opinion. 
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Balloting procedures have an independent influence. For 
example, the "reversal'' phenomenon exhibited in the second example 
of a scoring model, above, is clearly applicable to the group decision 
case. Majority rule also has 11 perverse 11 attributes. In particular. it 
can result in inefficient choices. Suppose there are three cormnittee 
members (a, b, c) and four projects (w, x, y, z). The preferences 
of a, b, and c are -- where the alternatives are listed in order of 
preference -- w, x, y, z; y, z, w, x; and z, w, x, y respectively. 
They eliminate w in favor of z; a majority favors z. A majority 
favors y over z; and then a majoritr prefers x over y. Thus, they 
choose x. However, everyone prefers w, over the chosen alternative x. 
All balloting processes have 11 problems, 11 the nature of which 
are investigated most systematically in the axiomatic social choice 
literature of economics and political science. There are also some 
attempted laboratory tests [Birnberg, Pondy and Davis, 1970]. No 
generalization other than that-- relevant to R&D management-- can 
be made at this time. We simply call the reader's attention to these 
phenomena in the hope that he will not proceed on the assumption that 
certain facets of decision analysis take care of themselves when, in 
fact, they do not. 
II. DIRECT POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
THEORETIC LITERATURE 
Much of the research on research in this area is structured 
around a rather narrow managerial point of view and is of questionable 
relevance to matters of broad social policy. Very little from a social 
or economic point of view is offered, with exceptions to this rule being 
papers published in economics or works commissioned by the government 
for the purpose of the develcpment of science policy. The preponderance 
of literature is devoted to the development of techniques to aid managers 
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in solving certain types of reasonably well-defined problems. As 
methods they may be helpful at points of policy application, but the 
conclusion to be drawn at this stage is that the literature has not been 
devoted to the. d-evelopment of behavioral regularities which could 
potentially serve as the basis for national R&D policies. Such behavioral 
regularities that have been isolated were done so because of their 
relevance to the solution of particular managerial problems. The 
potential generality of behavioral results has not been of great importance 
to researchers and consequ€~ntly remains almost completely unexamined. 
If a fact will not help make a. few bucks it is likely to go unappreciated 
in the areas which we have t·eviewed. 
There are two fundamental modes by which national R&D efforts 
can be organized. The following quote catches the essence of the choice: 
In management-centered organizations the problems and tasks 
facing the concern as a whole are broken down into specialisms. 
Each individual pursues his task as something distinct from the 
real tasks of the organization, as if it were lhe subject of a 
sub-contract. "Somebody at the top 11 is responsible for seeing 
to its relevance. The technical methods, duties, and powers 
attached to each functional role are precisely defined. Interaction 
within management tends to be vertical, i.e. , between superior 
and subordinates. Operations and working behaviour are governed 
by instructions and decisions issued by superiors. This command 
hierarchy is maintained by the implicit assumptior. that all knowledge 
about the situation of the firm and its tasks is, or should be, 
available only to the head of the firm. Management, often visualized 
as the complex hierarchy familiar in organisation charts, operates 
a simple control system, with information flowing up through a 
succession of filters, and decisions and instructions flowing 
downwards through a succession of amplifiers. 
Entrepreneur-centered syste1ns arc adapted to unstable 
conditions, when problems and requirements for action arise 
which cannot be broken down and distributed among specialist roles 
within a closely defined hierarchy. Individuals have to perform 
their special tasks in the light of their knowledge of the tasks of 
the firm as a whole. Tasks lose much of their formal definition 
in terms of methods, duties, and powers, which have to be redefined 
continually by interaction with others participating in the task. 
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Interaction runs laterally as much as vertically. Cornrnunication 
betv.:een people of different ranks tends to resemble lateral 
consultation rather than vertical command. Omniscience can no 
longer be imputed to the head of the concern. [T. Burns, 1967} 
Both modes of organization involve the use of goals. With the 
former, management-centered goals are clearly specified at the top. 
With the latter, the goals are left largely unspecified, To the extent 
that they exist at all, they are implicit in the incentive structure (as 
opposed to the ''duties'') of an organization, 
Is there an objective means of setting goals at the national level? 
The answer to this question at the practical level is No. At the theoretical 
level the answer is No. At the philosophical level the answer is probably 
No. This conclusion is of major importance. Logic and order have a 
very great appeal and it is easy to believe that a panacea for resolving 
questions of judgment exists if only it can be found. This belief tends to 
foster self-deception. Individuals tend to adopt complicated method-
ologies when they cannot see the full ramifications. 
The reasons for the negative answers above revolve around the 
lack of an accepted definition of social preference. If an accepted 
definition could be found then we would need only to formulate manage-
ment standards and controls which_ would assure the socially m.ost 
preferred pattern of R&D acbvities as a result. Now in the case of a 
firm, this might not be hard La do. There is Ct'rtainly a harmony of 
interests among owners. At the social level, however, such harmony is 
lacking. R&D results which help one group arc !ikely to harm som.e 
other group; consequenlly, thinking at the national level by analogy to 
an individual or a firm can get one into trouble. 
The following summarizes the thinking of a managerial group 
about the means of establishing and managing national R&D activities: 
Briefly, the allocation process may be summarized as a process 
o[ assigning weighting !actors acc.ording to a methodical procedure; 
applying the Program Weighting Factors to the Normalized Program 
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Value Curves for each group of Programs associated with a Field; 
allocating to the Programs within a Field fund dollars to derivE: 
Normalized Field Value Curves; derive Weighted Field Value Curves 
by applying the Overall Field Worth factors to the Normalized Field 
Value Curves; allocating the assumed Federal R&D budget, minus 
such items as agency sustaining funds and agency discretionary 
funds, to the various Fields, utilizing the Weighted Field Value 
Curves; and, finally allocating the field funds to the Programs 
within a Field by the allocation process utilizing Weighted Program 
Value Curves. (Study Report, UCLA, 1970) 
The key idea for us to dwell upon is the concept of "weights. 1 ' 
The role of such weights is to induce values on competing R&D activities. 
That is, they implicitly induce a preference, at the social level, on R&D 
allocations and thus are of maximum importance. How are such weights 
to be det.ermined and by whom'? It is unlikely that Congress or some high 
level advisory committee would assign numbers to abstract entities without 
a rather complete understanding of the implications. Besides, presumably 
at this stage Congress does not know or have an opinion about patterns of 
research acUvity. Most likely at this stage it is seeking adv·icc as to what 
it should or might want rather than seeking to implement those wishes it has 
already articulated. The weights, then, must come from somewhere else, 
Supposedly, they will r·eflect lhe preferences of the soc:(_ty at 
large. But this answer brings us back to our initial problem. HeN/ docs 
one define the "social preference' 1? A review of the balloting prr_,ct-clc:res 
discussed above should serve to alert the reader to how really complicated 
and deep the problem is. Clearly, the procedures outlined above will 
not do. "What about other procedures? On" ca1~ pro\·e they all ha·.'e: 
difficulties, This is the major implication of research specializ:r:,;; on 
these problems. (Plott, 1972] Concepts which have a social prderence 
as a background condition are E~xt.remely limiting and should p:rubably 
be avoided. 
This discussion has some practical in1plication::: apart from the 
methodological. Expressions such as "social preference," "social 
utility, 11 and 11 social we1fare' 1 should be used with reservation in the 
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actual policy formulation. They are not likely to lead to restrictions 
on behavior which are not already imposed by the general legal st-ructure. 
If all that one intends is for decision makers to ''consider 11 someone 
other than himself, the terms might be useful. As terms intended to 
convey a rather narrow course of prescribed actions, however, these 
are likely to fail and such a failure can be costly. 
There is, for example, a tendency to use such vague words in 
attempts to direct firms toward problems related to public needs (e. g., 
transportation, education, health care}. The lack of market creation 
in areas where public funds determine size, characteristics, and timing 
of market demand, was identified at [A. D. Little, Inc., 1973] to be a 
major barrier to innovation. The recommendation was to 11 Formulate 
performance criteria (technical, economic, social, institutional) 
considering both public needs and industry's delivery capabilities, in 
order to clarify demand and characteristics" (p. 81). Researchers should 
be made aware of the pitfalls which linger with concepts such as group 
preference. These notions may be useful at the individual o1· firm 
level, but they are not really useful at the social level. The problem 
with using many of the methods found in the manag<:>mcnt-oriented 
literature is that they generally presuppose the existence of a social 
preference. 
Are there tools which might help improve the coordination of 
governmentally sponsored research efforts? Are there tools developed 
in this literature which, for a given outlay, would help governmental 
research directors (a) improve the sequencing of research efforts in 
order to anticipate research demands, (b) coordinate research efforts 
in order to take care of complimentarities, (c) reduce the time between 
decision and use by making researchers aware of "related" projects 
and researchers? The answer is, in a sense, Yes. Models exist which 
help organize information and which systematically call attention to a 
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large number of facts. Generally the n1odels are not considered to be 
accurate predictive devices, but they are frequently regarded as helpful 
(Morgenstern, Shephard, Grabowski, in Yovits, et al., 1966]. 
Input-output techniques can be modified for R&D analysis 
[Morgenstern, Shephard, Grabowski, in Yovits, et al., 1966], [Dean, 
1967]. The idea is to develop a table representing the ''interactions" 
between different fields of science. Another table models the interaction 
between various fields of science and technolog}' with the remaind~r of 
the economy. Such a model, at a conceptual level, can be used to 
identify potential bottlenecks in research efforts as well as areas of 
research which could be in demand as a result of a change in the 
composition of the production output. Models such as this, as well as 
those mentioned in the next paragraph, can bC' supplemented wHh trend 
analysis and/or Delphi techniques. Both have been used considerably 
for "futures" analysis; and both provide useful information about likely 
future events. Neither is wid(•!y proclaimed as a reliable means of 
modeling b:•chnological dcvelop.ment, however. 
Many adaptations of critical path and linear programming 
methods of optimization exist. These models relate· to the cfficit~n! 
attainment of prespccificd goals. Morphological <tnaly:ois and relevance 
Lrecs form the grcat<:>r part of such technique's [Juntsch, 19(,7]. ThC' 
baSic idea is ont· of specifying the goals of an entire R&D divisiun. 
Efforts are then made to define feasible ways of obtaining these guals. 
The tcchniqu~s are designed to facilitate, primarily, the lal!l'r t.:•sk 
an.d provide an algorithm for soldng the optimization problem. Consensus 
in the managt>mcntlitcratun· would not be favorably disposed to th~sc 
methods. The reader should consult a r('ference such as [Cctron, 
Martino and Roepck"", 1967] or [Beattie and Reader, 1971] for a more 
positively inclined evaluation. 
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III. INDIRECT IMPLICATIONS OF THE LITERATURE 
There is not a method, technique or scientific law in these 
areas which can simply be applied in some direct fashion as a backbone 
for a national policy. However, from the discussions and models we 
can draw some generalizations about the nature of R&D which may be 
relevant. In particular we are willing to _draw some conclusions about 
the nature of the "externality11 relationships in R&D which can be used 
in the design of market and nonmarket institutions. 
Examination of the R&D.literature on research an.~ development 
induced the following classification of R&D projects: (1) exploratory, 
(2) high risk business development, and (3) support for existing business. 
This classification scheme, developed by Gee [1971], does not amount 
to an 11iron law'' of R&D management. The classes seem to be 
meaningful to managers and many R&D managers are prepared to 
make generalizations about the nature of proj~cts and problems 
within a given category. There are alternative or competing 
classifications, see (Quinn, 1949; Gordon, 1966; Ackoff: 1966]. 
To us, this classificatior, suggests two different dimensions 
along which one might think about R&D projects. The first pertains to 
the likelihood of successfully attaining stated research goals. The 
second dimension has to do with how narrowly research purposes are 
focused. Exploratory projects are those which are risky and which 
have 11broad" implications in terms of the number of products and 
processes-potentially effected. Projects in the sec-:Jnd category are ones 
which are risky but have a narrow focus, while the third category contains 
low-risk, narrowly-focused projects, We hesitate to use expressions 
such as 11degree of risk 11 and "narrowness of focus" since an underlying, 
quantitative system of measurement seems to be implied. No accepted 
system exists. Nevertheless, we suspect that "similarity" rankings of 
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a given set of projects along these dimensions \''Could show a great deal 
of stability across experienced R&D 1nanagers. That is, we suspect 
that these intuitive ideas, risk and focus, capture the structure on 
which analogies and judgments about the similarity of projects- are based. 
R&D.output can also be classified according to the user. There 
are three categories of users of interest to us: (1) other basic researchers, 
(2) technology-oriented resear•:hers who work on new products, and (3) 
technology-oriented researchers who are focused upon product improve-
ment and cost reduction techniques. Of course, these classes are 
bound to overlap somewhat. But the literature under consideration 
supports the contention that the: overlap is minimal [Ackoff, in Yovits, 
et al., 1966]. More importantly, it seems to be the case that projects 
classified- fu category (1) in the: first classification would be used by 
group (1) in the second category. In other words, the results of 
exploratory research are used primarily by other researchers, 
diagram might be helpful: 
Intended Users ~~nd Use of Research Output 
(researchers) 
further research 
(tee hnologists) 
new products 
low risk 
A 
and broad focus and narrow focus and narrow focus 
Nature of Research Activily 
This dichotomy, when taken together with son:;_· c·rnpirica1 
relationships, suggests a structure of externality or "public g0ods" 
relationships. The empirical relationships have to do with Lhe means 
by which the transfer of research output from one group t(J anuthc:r lakes 
place, This aspect of R&D-- the transfer -- differs according to whom 
the users are. 
In particular, scientists tt:nd to use wrillen means of transfer, 
27 
while technologists tend to communicate orally (Allen, 1966a and 1966b]. 
It appears that as one mov-es from the left of the spectrum, where 
research is exploratory, to the right, the means of 11 effectiv-e" 
communication changes from written papers to oral communication. 
In a sense, this is easy to understand. The application of technology 
requires a familiarity with many special features of a problem. The 
use of a person in the transfer of technical knowledge allows immediate, 
selective, creative responses to statements, People placed face to 
face have all of their senses at work. In addition, there are factors of 
trust and belief which operate in the transfer and acceptance of 
information and which personal relationships tend to resolve. The 
special features of problems can be better meshed with the special 
features of knowledge by people working together, 
This communication feature of R&D means that the structure 
of outputs designed for basic researcher use-- the high risk, broadly 
focused research efforts -- tend to have the chal'act8ristics of a type 
(not the classical type) of public good [Plott and Meyer, 1974]. 
Due to the intrinsic characteristics of the ''fundamental 1 ' type 
of research, even if publication could be prevented and other controllable 
means of communicating knowledge substituted for it, an efficient 
market for 11basic" results could not be established. The output of 
11basic 11 research is often not seen to be of value -- even by the 
researcher who produced it. Such output must be "cast out" to the 
scientific community fer judgment, before value or even validity can 
be established. Often, only if some result of scientific research is 
first seen by a researcher will that researcher." realize th~· r-€_.sult would 
make a valuable contribution to his own work. Thus, scientific knowledge 
constitutes a commodity that must be 1'consumed" before it can be purchased 
at a price accurately reflecting its worth. However, once 1'known, 1' 
. there is clearly no reason to buy knowledge. Ergo, any market for 
• 
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ideas at the broadly focused research level would be inefficient 
. . . d f 1 expcns1ve to rna.1nta1n an en orce. 
So, we find that research which has broad implications ( 11basic 11 
research?) tends to have the attribute of a public good. In addition, it 
tends to be of value. Shotwf~ll [1971] indicates, for the group studied, 
that the scientific literature was the major source of new product ideaS. 
The fact that the information was in written form tends to support the 
idea it was "basic. 11 Utterback [1971] has noted that ideas tend to come 
from outside while solutions tend to come from inside. Presumably, 
11 solutions" are on the "nonbasic" end of knowledge. Bartocha, Narin 
and Stone [1970J concluded in the case of several new products, that 
about 70 percent of the key events that led to development were non-
mission oriented and occurred about twenty years prior to use, many 
of which presumably consisted of "basic" discoveries, Three empirical 
studies that also indicate the value of "basic" research are reviewed by 
Price and Bass [1969]. ll is true, however, that this general problem 
of the value and use of basic research has not received attention sufficient 
to assure a thorough understanding of the problem. For example, this 
general line of argument seems inconsistent with the results of "Project 
Hindsight, 11 where it was concluded that most of the results necessary 
for the completion of several n1ilitary innovations WC'rf> accomplished 
because of the mission alone [Iscnson, 1968}. Results along these lines 
are also reported in [Baker, Siegman and Rubenstein, 1967]. 
As we xno~·e in th(- direction of proj('cts with a greater focus, 
we begin to leave the public good aspf'cts of the research results. If 
transfer of technology is primarily accotnplished by person-to-person 
contact, exclusion is clearly possible. The value can in principle be 
1Example: Would E:instein have· put an ad in the paper offering 
to pllrchase Riemannian gc:on·tetry from someone so he could develop 
.his theory of relalivity? Would he have known how useful Riemannian 
geometry would be to him if he hadn 1 t already known it? 
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captured by the one who creates it. The possible case for social policy, 
here, is of a different nature, 
The scientific nature of focused research can be recognized 
and it can thus dictate the type of inputs the research project needs 
from a broader scientific background. Technologists can identify 
those individuals who are likely to_ have relev-ant information, Likewise, 
researchers with a broad background are capable of identifying special 
cases of their own expertise. Once the potential benefits of cooperation 
have been recognized, regular market relationships such as consulting 
contracts can serve as the organizing institutions. The indivisibility 
of an individual may have some implications. It might br hard to 
purchase just that aspect of a researcher which the customer desires. 
Institutions such as variable term consulting contracts, part-time 
employment, and people loans have evolved, in part, to solve this problem. 
This aspect of information flow does contain some hints which 
need to be pursued, Professional meetings, journals and associations 
are all activities of a 11 public 11 nature which are likely to be very 
influential on the overall innovative activity within the country. Physical 
ties between research groups could possibly be encouraged with a 
consequential increased level of innovative activity. The strategy of 
supporting education and research in the universities tn.ay have been 
an important contribution to the U. S. technological successes. Such 
contributions could have resulted from the research findings and 
successes directly; but, more importantly, educational support 
advanced the creation of a very large number of researchers in the 
economic system who could serve as the means of transmitting 
information in the economy in general between the nonfocused, 
researcher-oriented researchers and the focused product-process 
oriented researchers. 
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IV. IMPRESSIONS AND OPINIONS 
A. What Can This Al:ea Do For Social R&D Policies? 
If an overall model exists which could serve as a basis for 
national R&D policies, it is not in the literature we surveyed. It is 
not difficult to find claims to the contrary, but in our opinion such claims 
are simply wrong and are based on an incomplete understanding of the 
many deep and complicated issues. 
Many fechniques c.an b(• found in this literature which could 
be useful to any R&D decision maker when organizing facts prior to 
decision or in understanding th8 consequences of previous decisions. 
We found no evidence of a single or set of ' 1best 11 techniques which 
could be recommended across the board. Rather, the besl technique 
appears to depend heavily upon the technical capabilities of the decision 
makers and the particulars of the decision situation. 
B. What Should Be tl~e Government's Rol~ in R&D? 
First, we think this literature indirectly lends suppor!: to the 
view that governmental financial assistance should be concentrated on 
the 11basic 11 end of the management, physical and social sciences. This 
is whe.re market institutions seem least able to organize resources 
appropriately. 
Secondly, a case can be made for student support. Apparently 
a high level of training amo.ng the population at large is a very important 
catalyst for technologio:..al advancement. It makes market institutions 
function "smoother" at the development end of the research sp"ctrum. 
We do not know whether or not this benefit of federally supported 
university research has be(:n fully appreciated·. 
Thirdly, management activities at the national level should be 
limited to coordination and related activities. Supervision and evaluation 
should come from other sources. Inslilulions and incentives should be 
structured so that the 11customer," the one who is the user of the 
research (in the case of basic research the "custorners" are simply 
other researchers). should be an active participant in choosing the 
directions of research support. The government should inflt1ence the 
choice between competing projects and areas indirectly by deciding 
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who the recipients are to be and including them in the allocativ-e 
process. This means that in the case of basic research the judgment 
between competing projects should be made by other basic researchers. 
The peer review process, for example, developed by NSF, emerges 
very favorably from this line of analysis. Formulation of detailed 
purposes should be 11decentralized. n Influence on the direction of 
research should be expressed by those who legislators feel should be 
the recipients of research results, 
Finally, there seems to be reason to believe that market 
institutions can adequately deal with research at the development end 
of R&D. Educational support and B!lpport for means .of scienl'ific 
interaction at a "face-to-face'' level (m<2etings, etc.) might be justifiable 
on efficiency grounds. Governmental involvement with technology 
development at the very "appliedn level cannot be supported from this 
line of analysis unless the technology itself is to be used by the 
government. 
C. What 'Kind of Research on the R&D Process is Needed? 
In keeping with the spirit of this section, we will bluster forth 
with an opinion on the type of research on research which is need~d. 
It is our opinion that in the areas we have reviewed there is a great 
need for basic theoretical and experimental work. Of the hundreds 
of papers on the nature of research examined by us, only a small 
percentage would qualify as dealing with the matter at the basic or 
broadly focused level-- many of these are cited here. The preponderance 
of written works provide anecdotes and ad hoc theories. There exists a 
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plethora of opinions but the instances of integrated theorie!:i, rt·plicablc 
results and precisely formulated models arc very sparse indeC'd. 
Existing theoretical works are full of potential but the body 
of theory lacks the refinement, breadth, consistency and general 
acceptance which accompanies large-scale scientific attention. In 
part this may reflect a general lack of financial support for basic 
research in the social scientific areas over the years as compared to 
the support experienced by the physical sciences. Regardless of the 
reason, however, it is a lack of work at a foundations level which prevents 
one from confidently extrapolo.ting and systematically applying the 
implications of the theories which are found in these areas to questions 
of national policy. 
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